𝗗𝗶𝗴𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗴 𝗕𝗮𝘆𝗮𝗻, 𝗛𝗶𝗻𝗱𝗶 𝗧𝗲𝗿𝗼𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗺𝗼!

In the realm of international law, UN General Assembly Resolution 37/43 reaffirms the legitimacy of peoples’ struggles for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation “by all available means, including armed struggle.” 

This finds support in our own 1987 Constitution. Bernas’ commentary on the 1987 Constitution (p. 66) is instructive: “the armed forces can be a legitimate instrument for the overthrow of a civilian government that has ceased to be a servant of the people. Such conclusion also finds support in the principle, accepted by the Commission but not made explicit, that a long standing tyranny can be legitimately overthrown.” 

This statement finds its origins in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (required reading in San Beda’s human rights law class): “The purpose of the law is to protect and get compensation for the innocent, by an unbiased treatment of all who come under it; and when this is not genuinely done, war is made upon the sufferers, and they —having nowhere on earth to appeal to for justice—are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.” This “appeal” is, of course, armed rebellion. 

None of these legal sources upholding the validity of armed struggle are even Communistic in the slightest. They rest upon the historically-proven fact that armed struggle has not only been just, but also necessary in many cases. 

The so-called Anti-Terror Law is just the latest attempt by the reactionary State to blur the distinctions between what a “terrorist” and “rebel” really is. 

Retired Justice Antonio Carpio differentiates rebellion and terrorism in simple terms: “The intent of rebels is to remove any territory or military force of the Philippines from allegiance to the Government or its laws, or to deprive the President or Congress of any of their powers. The intent of terrorists is to intimidate the public and the Government, create fear, or destabilize the political, economic, and social structure of the country.” 

This "fine line" between the two deliberately muddies the waters. It is settled in People v. Hernandez (1956) and Enrile v. Amin that “all crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.” Thus, even “acts which intimidate the public and Government” should only be punished as rebellion if the aim is also “to remove any territory or military force of the Philippines from allegiance to the Government,” which is what the revolutionary forces aim to do, in order to enact genuine land reform, mass-oriented education, and genuine nationalism. 

Why then, did the Anti-Terrorism Council designate the CPP, NPA, and NDFP as "terrorist organizations?" 

In the Philippines, the armed struggle of the New People’s Army of course features prominently in our jurisprudence: 

According to Bernas: “A disenchanted peasantry remains even today a major source of recruitment for the armed forces of communism in the Philippines.” (p. 416) 

Justice Sarmiento’s dissent in Taruc v. Ericta: “Leftism (and/or genuine Nationalism) and Communism are half- brothers in the sense that both advocate radical change in society, and advocate it passionately.” 

He also quoted Chief Justice Teehankee’s valedictorian praising those part of the underground National Democratic movement: “driven by their dreams to free our motherland from poverty, oppression, iniquity and injustice, many of our youthful leaders were to make the supreme sacrifice.” 

People v. Hernandez (1956), citing Cuello Calon’s Derecho Penal, is instructive: “Those to which the perpetrator is induced for a selfish and vile motive will not be considered political crimes (...) the criminality of these events does not contain the same immorality as common delinquency, which is only relative, depending on the time, the place, the circumstances, the country's institutions. Others invoke the elevation of the motives and determining feelings of these facts, the love of the country, the fervent adherence to certain ideas or principles, the spirit of sacrifice for the triumph of an ideal.” 

Indeed, as Chief Justice Puno put it in Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates v. NLRC (1993): “The 14-year battle to end martial rule produced many martyrs and foremost among them were the radicals of the labor movement.” 

The “supreme sacrifice” that Chief Justice Teehankee was talking about was the thousands of Filipinos killed, many as part of their participation in the revolutionary New People’s Army. They are “martyrs,” especially those in the labor movement. 

This is the history of the country that the fascist “Anti-Terror” Law tries so hard to erase.