Draft of "Logic and Dialectics"

The identity of a thing is important because humans necessarily seek to think logically. If you have a glass of water, take a note of its temperature. It might be either hot or cold, depending on the weather. 

In other words, it is logical that A (hot), and B (cold) are separate and distinct from one another. 

So, we can put it in this way, in terms of formal logic - 

A is A 

B is B 

A is not B 

B is not A 

These are logical statements, and are completely valid in practice. But this is only true for as long as what we’re doing is talking about these three at a particular time. We might think that assuming the particular time should be a given when talking about how to put the identity of all these different temperatures in our mind, but in practice, this leads to jumbled up things in our minds, and makes us inflexible. 

No one’s going to argue against the practicality of logic. In fact, we have this practicality in mathematics: 2 + 3 = 5 all the time. But this is only because numbers are capable of being yanked out of their particular space and times. In real life, what “one or two” of a particular thing is very different. For example, one grain of rice is “one” in our mind, but put many of them in a bag, and we have “one bag” of rice, consisting of many different grains. But one grain of rice is composed of millions of different atoms as well. And if you press two grains of rice together, they stick to each other and become only one grain of rice. On the other hand, our perception is attuned to practical use, and thus we segregate things into “one” of a thing because it gives us a practical purpose for thinking about things. One bag of rice, etc., is how we measure the quantity of rice that we eat, and definitely not by atoms. 

So logic, and by extension mathematics, is always valid. But in the former, we don’t deal with numbers. We deal with concepts, and therefore we aren’t at such a great liberty to ignore the fact of their state in constant flux, their dialectical nature. 

Plekhanov says that: 

Formal logic analyzers the states of rest of bodies 

Dialectical logic for the analysis of movement and development 

But first we’ve got to understand what “rest” is, because matter is always in motion, and a state of rest. 

Rest refers to a special, limiting case of motion with regard to another body (a “movement” with zero speed). So, it’s possible to have something in motion and possible even in contradiction with regard to something, but at rest with regard to some other thing. 

Mao says that an egg is in contradiction with itself, it develops into a chick. But a stone is not in contradiction with itself, and can never hatch into anything. So, a stone is at rest in its own environment, because it’s not in contradiction. But in the hands of a person protesting a demolition, a stone thrown at a policeman is now in contradiction with the policeman, it has to inflict damage on that policeman. But that stone isn’t in contradiction with the egg in this example, but we can make it so by means of a thought experiment, so that we can pretend that both the stone and an egg are placed in an incubator, and in that way we put the stone and egg at odds with each other, as to the matter of producing a chick, and the former will never hatch, whereas the latter will. The left adventurists say that urban insurrectionism will bear revolutionary fruit, whereas the revolutionary movement says that the protracted people’s war will. These are in contradiction with each other, but only the latter has borne fruit. The left adventurist tactics are therefore so insignificant that they can be considered at rest, just like a stone in an incubator which will bear no chick. 

In dialectical as well as in formal logic, we can’t look at a thing by itself. It always has to be with reference to some other thing. So, if we say “A is here,” then we can only give this statement meaning if we also say “not-A isn’t here” and thereby reference A with not-A. 

In Anti-Duhring, Engels says “as long as we observe things in a state of rest and inertia, we do not find in them any contradiction. But if we observe them in movement, change, interaction, we get at once into contradictions. Even a simple mechanical change of place can be achieved only so that the body does and does not find itself simultaneously in the same place.” 

Schaff says “When we speak about a body as resting, we have in mind the lack of some form of movement, not absolute rest. The body is at rest in relation to some other body if both of them move with the same speed and acceleration in regard to all other bodies.” 

To expand on this, Cornforth says that “all rest, all equilibrium is only relative, and only has meaning in relation to one or other definite form of motion. A body, for example, may be on the ground in mechanical equilibrium, may be mechanically at rest; but this in no way prevents it from participating in the motion of the earth and in that of the whole solar system, just as little as it prevents its most minute parts from carrying out the oscillations determined by its temperature, or its atoms from passing through a chemical process.” 

Cemal says “formal logic, even in its most abstract forms, has an ontological claim by the identity rule. But this correspondence is valid only for an assumed world where life is at rest, and the limit between different entities (for example, between circle and polygon, pink and white) is arbitrarily drawn.” 

To expand on this, Bogomolov says that “formal logic makes abstractions; chief among them the restriction of all operations to the field of invariable relations and invariable contents of the forms of thought with which these operations are performed, because it would otherwise be impossible to achieve the formalization itself, that it, the expression of relations, contents, and operations by means of symbols presupposing the invariance the stability of what they express.”

For example, when formal logic says “a bald man isn’t a man lush with hair,” and therefore A is not B, it makes an abstraction of a bald man, calls it A, and ascribes (formalizes) to A relations and contents to B which are unchanging, invariable, at rest. Thus Bogomolov further applies the real world to it, and therefore shows us that “formal logic is necessary, but not sufficient, and if we wish to make an epistemological, theoretical-cognitive investigation, there must be some more profound and more general science of thought. Such a science is dialectical, because dialectical logic is concerned with thought as a whole, and particularly with thought that changes in its content.” 

But just because formal logic only deals with (1) objects at rest and (2) invariable relations and contents of the forms of thought with which these operations are performed, does not diminish its relevance. In fact, Bogomolov also says that, in formal logic, “since the constant is an extreme case of change (zero change), formal logic becomes an extreme case of dialectical logic.” 

It’s only when we take a metaphysical view of formal logic, where “the world is divided into independent, autonomous and self-sufficient elements, and stay so eternally,” that we fall into problems. 

Mao has a very good example of this. In formal logic, the law of identity states that “in the process of thought, a concept remains unchanged throughout, being forever equal to itself.” We know that in some cases this is true. Mathematics teaches us that 2 of something and 3 of another thing of the same type is always 5. If we have 2 bags of rice and 3 other bags, we have 5. If we have 2 bags of rice and 3 grains of rice, we have 2 bags of rice and 3 grains of rice only. If we have A in a particular spot, Not-A is not in that particular spot. If we have A in a particular spot, and he’s holding B (a bag of rice), then A and B are both in one and the same spot. 

But if we take a metaphysical view of logic, and take its “ontological assumption” in an inflexible manner, then we end up with statements like “the Philippines before the Spanish came,” which doesn’t make sense because there never was a “Philippines” then, especially during the time when Philip II wasn’t even born yet, and moreover, it was a Philippines under many different polities, or the semi-communal and semi-slave system, which is very different to the current semi-feudal and semi-colonial state we have at present. Yet many historians conflate the two, because they think that the concept of “the Philippines” is forever equivalent to itself. And so we have textbooks that promote just this very idea.  

Just the same, Mao criticizes those who, relying on the law of identity, say that “China is forever equal to China,” not recognizing that China is changing, and that the age-old feudal China of the past and the free and liberated China of the future are two different things. 

A problem comes about when, to the shock and horror of the bureaucrat-capitalists in Congress, who strictly interpret the law of identity even to things in motion, that certain people within the territory of the Philippines have never considered themselves “Filipino” and in fact take it as a source of pride that they were able to resist the Spanish invaders, for 333 long years. And when these politicians find that out, they are aghast at the aspiration of these same people to independence or at least a wide margin of self-rule, and in their intolerance (“how could anyone think the Philippines isn’t a country which should necessarily include everyone in it, subject to the same laws”), subject these people to violence. So we have people who think that the Moro people, “belong to the Philippines” and can’t fathom why the Moros would want to live differently, be respected in their religion, not be displaced by the Christians, and not be subjected to all the national legislation that Congress cooks up. The same is true for the Cordilleran people, composed of many different people that Congress thinks of as comprising one, and even the Philippine languages, which are considered “dialects” of Tagalog. 

Bogomolov says it best: “the model of reality studied by dialectical knowledge is not language [an invariable one], but scientific knowledge in its development, in all the multiplicity of its processes and results.” 

Why should we consider the “semi-communal and semi-slave Philippines” and the “semi-colonial and semi-feudal Philippines” different from each other? Because they have different identities. How can we say that their identities are different? To answer this, let’s look at what the dialectical identity of a thing is. 

Mao says: “What is especially important and necessary, constituting as it does the foundation of our knowledge of a thing, is to observe what is particular to this form of motion of matter, namely, to observe the qualitative difference between this form of motion and other forms. Only when we have done so can we distinguish between things. Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another.” 

And moreover, that “of two contradictory aspects, one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction.”’

In other words, in order to discern the identity of something; in order for us to say that we know the identity of semi-colonial and semi-feudal Philippines is to discern the following things: 

1. The particular form of the motion of semi-communal and semi-slave Philippines; or the qualitative difference between semi-communal and semi-slave Philippines and semi-colonial and semi-feudal Philippines 

2. The contradiction between semi-communal and semi-slave Philippines and semi-colonial and semi-feudal Philippines 

3. The principal aspect in the particular moment of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal Philippines that we’re talking about 

To simplify, in order to get the identity of a thing, we have to look at its motion, what it is opposed to, and the principal aspect in the particular moment (temporality). The first two help sketch the general phenomenon of something, and the last situates it in a particular time frame, so that we can adapt it to differences in condition. 

To do this, we use the scientific method. We don’t just go and think about things without doing them. And even if we read in a book that “wet weather happens when these particular environmental forces are at work,” the person who wrote that book used the scientific method to experience these for himself. The ultimate source of all knowledge is obtained scientifically. 

Of course, “scientifically” doesn’t refer to a lab where all variables can be controlled — there are sciences where that isn’t the case. Astronomers use nothing but their sense of sight and several other precision instruments to determine the composition of stars and planets, and their ages. They can’t personally go up to the stars themselves; astronomers have also figured out how stars are formed without having to personally collide great masses of elements together. 

Just the same with the social sciences — we can’t take a city and put different controls on people, such as adding or restricting voting rights, laws, etc., on a whim. But we can observe society as a whole, and even play small roles in political practice, such as expanding organization, firming up our arguments on a given issue, how to reach the masses in plain and simple language regarding our stand, etc., and with that knowledge, taking into account differing variables, we find the best ways to organize, etc.